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Abstract: Web application security has become a major concern in recent years, as more and more content and services
are available online. A useful method for identifying security vulnerabilities is black-box testing, which relies
on an automated crawling of web applications. However, crawling Rich Internet Applications (RIAs) is a very
challenging task. One of the key obstacles crawlers face is the state similarity problem: how to determine if
two client-side states are equivalent. As current methods do not completely solve this problem, a successful
scan of many real-world RIAs is still not possible. We present a novel approach to detect redundant content for
security testing purposes. The algorithm applies locality-sensitive hashing using MinHash sketches in order
to analyze the Document Object Model (DOM) structure of web pages, and to efficiently estimate similarity
between them. Our experimental results show that this approach allows a successful scan of RIAs that cannot
be crawled otherwise.
1 INTRODUCTION
The information era has turned the Internet into a cen-
tral part of modern life. Growing amounts of data and
services are available today, making web application
development an important skill for both enterprises
and individuals. The heavier the reliance on web ap-
plications, the higher the motivation of attackers to
exploit security vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, such
vulnerabilities are very common (Gordeychik et al.,
2010), leading to an increasing need to detect and re-
mediate them.
Black-box security scanners address the problem
of ensuring secured web applications. They simulate
the behavior of a user crawling an application with-
out access to the source code. When discovering new
pages and new content, the scanner performs a se-
ries of automated security tests, based on a database
of known vulnerabilities. This way, the application
can be easily and thoroughly analyzed from a secu-
rity point of view. See (Bau et al., 2010; Doupe´ et al.,
2010) for surveys on available scanners.
It is clear that a comprehensive security scan re-
quires, among other factors, both high coverage and
efficiency. If the crawler cannot reach significant parts
of the application in a reasonable time, then the secu-
rity assessment of the application will be incomplete.
In particular, a web crawler should refrain from wast-
ing time and memory resources on scanning pages
that are similar to previously visited ones. The defini-
tion of redundant pages depends on the crawling pur-
pose. For traditional web indexing purposes, different
contents imply different pages. However, for security
testing purposes, different sets of vulnerabilities im-
ply different pages, regardless of the exact content of
the pages.
While the problem of page similarity (or state
similarity) is a fundamental challenge for all web
crawlers (Pomika´lek, 2011), it has become even more
significant since the emergence of a new generation
of web applications, often called Rich Internet Appli-
cations (RIAs).
RIAs make extensive usage in technologies such
as AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) (Gar-
rett et al., 2005), which enable client-side processing
of data that is asynchronously sent to and from the
server. Thus, the content of a web page changes dy-
namically without even reloading the page. New data
from the server can be reflected to the user by modify-
ing the DOM (Nicol et al., 2001) of the page through
UI events, albeit no change was done to the URL it-
self. Although such technologies increase the respon-
siveness of web applications and make them more
user-friendly, they also pose a great difficulty on mod-
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ern web crawlers. While traditional crawlers focused
on visiting all possible URLs, current-day crawlers
should examine every client state that can be gener-
ated via an execution of a series of HTML events.
The exponentially large number of possible states
emphasizes the need to efficiently detect similarity
between different application states. Failing to solve
the state similarity problem results in a poor scan
quality. If the algorithm is too strict in deciding
whether two states are similar, then too many redun-
dant states would be crawled, yielding long or even
endless scans. On the other hand, if the resemblance
relation is too lax, the crawler might mistakenly
deem new states as near-duplicates of previously-seen
states, resulting in an incomplete coverage.
As stated before, every URL of a RIA is actually
a dynamic application, in which states are accessed
through UI events. Consequently, eliminating dupli-
cate content cannot rely solely on URL analysis, such
as in (Bar-Yossef et al., 2009). Instead, a common
method that black-box scanners use in order to de-
cide whether two pages are similar, is to analyze their
DOM structure and properties, without taking the text
content into account. This is a useful approach for se-
curity oriented crawling, since often the text content
of a page is irrelevant to the security assessment. As
opposed to the content, the elements and logic that al-
low user interaction are more relevant for a security
analysis. For example, consider a commercial web
application with a catalog section, containing thou-
sands of pages. The catalog pages share the same
template, yet every one of them is dedicated to a dif-
ferent product. While the variety of products may be
of interest for search engines like Google or Yahoo, it
is of no great importance to black-box security scan-
ners, as all pages probably share the same set of se-
curity vulnerabilities. Therefore, an analysis of the
DOM structures of the pages might suggest that they
are near-duplicates of each other.
In the past decade, several methods have been pro-
posed to determine similarity between DOMs (see
section 2). Most of the methods include DOM nor-
malization techniques, possibly followed by applying
simple hash functions. While these methods were
proven to be successful in scanning several RIAs,
they are often too strict, leading to a state explo-
sion problem and very long scans. Moreover, since
hash functions used in this context so far have, to
the best of our knowledge, no special properties, mi-
nor differences between two canonical DOM forms
might result in two completely different hash values.
Therefore, many complex applications still cannot be
crawled in a reasonable time. Approaches involving
distance measures, such as (Mesbah and Van Deursen,
2008), are not scalable and require computing dis-
tances between all-pairs of DOMs.
In this paper we present a different approach
for the state similarity problem for security oriented
crawling. Our approach is based on locality-sensitive
hashing (LSH) (Indyk and Motwani, 1998), and on
MinHash sketches in particular (Broder, 1997; Broder
et al., 2000). A locality-sensitive hash function satis-
fies the property that the probability of collision, or at
least close numerical hash values, is much higher for
similar objects than for other objects. LSH schemes
have already been used in the context of detecting
duplicate textual content (see (Pomika´lek, 2011) for
a survey). Recently, MinHash sketches have also
become an efficient solution for bioinformatic chal-
lenges, where large amounts of biological sequence
data require efficient computational methods. As
such, they can be used to detect inexact matches be-
tween genomic sequences (Berlin et al., 2015; Popic
and Batzoglou, 2016). However, LSH techniques
have not yet been used by black-box security scan-
ners. The flexibility of MinHash sketches enables de-
tecting duplicate states if two DOMs differ in a small
number of DOM elements, regardless of their type.
The LSH technique that we use makes the algorithm
scalable for large RIAs as well. Combined together,
our method makes exploring industrial RIAs feasible.
This paper is an extended version of the one appeared
in the proceedings of ICISSP 2019 (Ben-Bassat and
Rokah, 2019).
2 RELATED WORK
A common approach for an efficient detection of du-
plicate states in AJAX applications is to apply sim-
ple hash functions on the DOM string representation.
The authors of (Duda et al., 2009) and (Frey, 2007)
compute hash values according to the structure and
content of the state. However, although these meth-
ods can remove redundant copies of the same state,
they are too strict for the purpose of detecting near-
duplicate pages.
CRAWLJAX (Mesbah and Van Deursen, 2008) is
a crawler for AJAX applications that decides whether
two states are similar according to the Levenshtein
distance (Levenshtein, 1966) between the DOM trees.
Using this method, however, for computing distances
between all-pairs of possible states is infeasible in
large RIAs. In a later work (Roest et al., 2010),
the state equivalence mechanism of the algorithm
is improved by first applying an Oracle Compara-
tor Pipelining (OCP) before hash values are com-
puted. Each comparator is targeted to strip the DOM
string from an irrelevant substring, which might cause
meaningless differences between two states, e.g., time
stamps, advertisement banners. CRAWLJAX is there-
fore less strict in comparing application states, but
the comparator pipeline requires manual configura-
tion and adjustment for every scan. FEEDEX (Fard
and Mesbah, 2013), which is built on top of CRAWL-
JAX, uses tree edit distance (Tai, 1979) to compare
two DOM trees.
The notion of Jaccard similarity is used in
jA¨k (Pellegrino et al., 2015). In this paper, the authors
consider two pages as similar if they share the same
normalized URL and their Jaccard index is above a
certain threshold. A normalized URL is obtained af-
ter stripping the query values and sorting the query
parameters lexicographically. The Jaccard similarity
is computed between sets of JavaScript event, links
and HTML forms that appear in the web pages.
Two techniques to improve any DOM based state
equivalence mechanism are presented in (Choudhary
et al., 2012). The first aims to discover unnecessary
dynamic content by loading and reloading a page.
The second identifies session parameters and ignores
differences in requests and responses due to them.
The DOM uniqueness tool described in (Ayoub
et al., 2013) identifies pages with similar DOM struc-
ture by detecting repeating patterns and reducing
them to a canonical DOM representation, which is
then hashed into a single numerical value. The user
can configure the algorithm and determine which
HTML tags are included in the canonical represen-
tation, and whether to include their text content. This
method captures structural changes, such as additions
or deletions of rows in a table. It is also not affected
by elements shuffling, since it involves sorting the ele-
ments in every DOM subtree. However, modifications
that are not recognized as part of a structural pattern
lead to a false separation between two near-duplicate
states. The method in (Moosavi et al., 2014) further
extends this algorithm by splitting a DOM tree into
multiple subtrees, each corresponding to an indepen-
dent application component, e.g., widgets. The DOM
uniqueness algorithm is applied on every component
independently, thus avoiding explosion in the number
of possible states when the same data is being dis-
played in different combinations.
The structure of a page is also the key for cluster-
ing similar pages in (Doupe´ et al., 2012), in which a
model of the web application’s state machine is built.
The authors model a page using its links (anchors
and forms), and store this information in a prefix tree.
These trees are vectorized and then stored in another
prefix tree, called the Abstract Page Tree (APT). Sim-
ilar pages are found by analyzing subtrees of the APT.
A different approach for clustering application
states into different equivalence clusters appears in
software tools that model and test RIAs using execu-
tion traces, such as RE-RIA (Amalfitano et al., 2008),
CrawlRIA (Amalfitano et al., 2010b), and CreRIA
(Amalfitano et al., 2010a). The clustering is done by
evaluating several equivalence criteria, which depend
on the DOM set of elements, event listeners and event
handlers. Two DOMs are considered equivalent if one
set contains the other as a subset. This method has a
high memory consumption and computation time.
Research efforts have been made during the years
in detecting near-duplicate text, especially in the con-
text of the Web. As the general problem of duplicate
content detection was not the focus of this paper, we
refer the readers to a detailed survey for more infor-
mation on the subject (Pomika´lek, 2011).
3 MINHASH SKETCHES
MinHash is an efficient technique to estimate the Jac-
card similarity between two sets. Given two sets, A
and B, the Jaccard similarity (Jaccard, 1901) of the
sets, J(A,B), is a measure of how similar the sets are:
J(A,B) =
|A∩B|
|A∪B| (1)
The Jaccard similarity value ranges between 0
(disjoint sets) and 1 (equal sets). However, direct
computation of this ratio requires iterating over all
the elements of A and B. MinHash (Broder, 1997)
is an efficient method to estimate the Jaccard similar-
ity of two sets, without explicitly constructing their
intersection and union. The efficiency of the method
comes from reducing every set to a small number of
fingerprints.
Let S be a set, and let h be a hash function whose
domain includes the elements of S. We define hmin(S)
as the element a of S, which is mapped to the mini-
mum value, among all the elements of S:
hmin(S) = argmina∈Sh(a) (2)
We consider again two sets of elements, A and B.
One can easily verify that:
Pr[hmin(A) = hmin(B)] = J(A,B) (3)
Eq. 3 implies that if we define a random variable
RA,B as follows:
RA,B =
{
1 if hmin(A) = hmin(B)
0 if otherwise (4)
then RA,B is an indicator variable which satisfies
E[RA,B] = J(A,B). However, RA,B is either 0 or 1, so it
is not useful as an estimator of the Jaccard similarity
of A and B. As it is done in many estimation tech-
niques, it is possible to reduce the variance of RA,B
by using multiple hash functions and computing the
ratio of the hash functions, for which the minimum
element is the same. In other words, assume now a
set of ` hash functions, h1, . . . ,h`. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ `
we define R(i)A,B as in Eq. 4, replacing h with h
i. The
improved estimator for the Jaccard similarity of A and
B, T (A,B), is now given by:
T (A,B) =
∑`i=1 R
(i)
A,B
`
(5)
By Chernoff bound, it can be shown that the ex-
pected error is O( 1√
`
).
The compressed representation
〈h1min(S), . . . ,h`min(S)〉 of a set S is defined as its
MinHash sketch. Since ` is significantly smaller than
the size of S, the estimation of the Jaccard similarity
is efficient in both time and memory.
4 METHOD
In this section we present the complete algorithm for
detecting duplicate content during a black-box secu-
rity scan. The first step is transforming a web page,
given as an HTTP response string, into a set of shin-
gles, or k-mers. In the second step, the algorithm
uses MinHash sketches in order to efficiently com-
pute similarity between pages. However, the method
described in section 3 still requires that we compute
the similarity between all possible pairs of states. In-
stead, we use an efficient LSH approach that focuses
only on pairs that are potentially similar. We outline
the complete algorithm at the end of this section.
4.1 Set Representation of Web Pages
As stated in section 1, the text content of a web page
is usually irrelevant for the state similarity problem in
the context of security scans. Therefore, we rely on
the DOM representation of the page. The algorithm
extracts the DOM tree from the HTTP response, and
serializes it to a string. The relevant information for
the state similarity task includes the DOM elements
and their structure, the events and the event handlers
that are associated with the elements, as well as some
of their attributes. Yet, for simplicity reasons, in this
paper we only consider the names of the elements and
the structure of the DOM.
Since we are interested in using MinHash, there is
a need to transform the string representation of the
DOM into a set of elements. For the sake of this
purpose, we use the notion of shingles, or k-mers,
which are sequences of any k consecutive words. In
this case, since the DOM elements are the building
blocks of the DOM tree, we consider every element as
a word. The algorithm can filter out part of the DOM
elements, if they are marked as irrelevant. Figure 1
illustrates the process of constructing the set repre-
sentation of an HTTP response.
A key factor in the performance of the algorithm
is the choice of the value of k. If k is too small, then
many k-mers will appear in all web pages, and most of
the pages will be similar to each other. Alternatively,
as the value of k becomes too high, the comparison of
states is too strict. So, k should have a large enough
value, such that the probability of different states shar-
ing the same k-mer, is low.
4.2 Efficient LSH for MinHash Sketches
To accelerate the process of detecting duplicate con-
tent, we use a hash table indexing approach, which re-
arranges the sketches in a way that similar states are
more likely to be stored closely in our data structure.
Dissimilar states, on the other hand, are not stored to-
gether, or are rarely stored in proximity. Such an ap-
proach is also used in other domains, e.g., genome
assembly (Berlin et al., 2015).
The algorithm constructs a data structure of ` hash
tables, each corresponding to a different hash func-
tion. In the i-th hash table, we map every hash value
v, which was computed by the i-th hash function, to a
set of DOM IDs, which correspond to DOMs that are
hashed to this value. So, if we denote the set of all
DOMs by P , and for every set-representation P ∈ P
we denote its ID by ID(P), then the i-th table is a
mapping of the following form:
v 7→ {ID(P) | P ∈ P ∧himin(P) = v} (6)
Using Eq. 3, we can see that the higher the Jac-
card similarity of two DOMs is, the higher the prob-
ability of their IDs being in the same set (or bucket).
Given two DOM representations, P and P′, we get
by Eq. 5 that an estimator for the Jaccard similarity
J(P,P′) can be computed according to the number of
hash tables, for which ID(P) and ID(P′) are in the
same bucket. This follows directly from the fact that
for every 1≤ i≤ `, if the i-th hash table contains both
ID(P) and ID(P′) in the same bucket, then it holds
that himin(P) = h
i
min(P
′). So, we can derive an esti-
mator, T ∗, for this particular LSH scheme, which is
based on Eq. 5. Let us denote the i-th hash table by gi,
Figure 1: Constructing a set representation of an HTTP response. (a) HTTP response snippet. The elements of the DOM tree
are marked in red. (b) Serialization of the corresponding DOM tree to a string. (c) The set of all 5-mers of consecutive DOM
elements. This is the set representation of the response for k = 5.
1≤ i≤ `, and let us mark the bucket which is mapped
to hash value v in the i-th table, by gi(v). We then
have:
T ∗(P,P′) =
∣∣{i | ∃v.ID(P), ID(P′)⊆ gi(v)}∣∣
`
(7)
Following Eq. 7, there is no need to compare ev-
ery DOM to all other DOMs. For every pair of DOM
representations, which share no common bucket, the
estimated value of their Jaccard similarity is 0.
4.3 The Complete Algorithm
We now combine the shingling process and the LSH
technique, and describe the complete algorithm for
detecting duplicate content, during a black-box secu-
rity scan. For simplicity, we assume a given set of
application states, S . With this assumption in mind,
we can discard the part of parsing web pages and ex-
tracting links and JavaScript actions. A pseudo-code
of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
In an initialization phase (lines 1-3), the code gen-
erates ` hash functions, out of a family H of hash
functions. For each hash function, hi, a correspond-
ing hash table, gi, is allocated in an array of hash ta-
bles. The rest of the code (lines 4-20) describes the
crawling process and the creation of an index of non-
duplicate pages.
For each application state, s, the algorithm cre-
ates its DOM set representation, P, using the method
Shingle(s,k). The method extracts the DOM tree of
the web page of state s, filters out all text and irrele-
vant elements, and converts the list of DOM elements
into a set of overlapping k-consecutive elements. We
omit the description of this method from the pseudo-
code.
lines 6-13 analyze the DOM set representation, P.
A MinHash sketch of the set of shingles is computed
by evaluating all hash functions. While doing so, we
maintain a count of how many times every DOM ID
shares the same bucket with the currently analyzed
DOM, P. This is done using a mapping, f , which is
implemented as a hash table as well, with a constant-
time insertion and lookup (on average). The highest
estimated Jaccard similarity score is then found (line
14). If this score is lower than the minimum threshold,
τ, then application state s is considered to have new
content for the purpose of the scan. In such a case, it
is added to the index, and the data set of hash values
is updated by adding the MinHash sketch of the new
state. Otherwise, it is discarded as duplicate content.
The state equivalence mechanism described here
is not an equivalence relation, since it is not transi-
tive. This fact implies that the order in which we an-
alyze the states can influence the number of unique
states found. For example, for every τ and every
odd integer m, we can construct a series of applica-
tion states s1, . . . ,sm, such that J(si,si+1)≥ τ for every
1≤ i≤ m−1, but J(si,s j)< τ for every 1≤ i, j ≤ m
such that |i− j| ≥ 2. Algorithm 1 outputs either bm2 c
or dm2 e unique states, depending on the scan order. Al-
though theoretically possible, we argue that web ap-
plications rarely exhibit such a problematic scenario.
Algorithm 1: Removing duplicate web application states.
Input: S : set of web application states
H : family of hash functions
k: shingle size
`: MinHash sketch size
τ: Jaccard similarity threshold
Output: set of states with no near-duplicates
1: 〈h1, . . . ,h`〉 ← sample ` functions from H
2: [g1, . . . ,g`]← array of ` hash tables
3: index← /0
4: for s ∈ S do
5: P← Shingle(s,k)
6: f ← mapping of type N→ N+
7: for i in range 1, . . . , ` do
8: v← himin(P)
9: for docId in gi(v) do
10: if docId ∈ f then
11: f (docId)← f (docId) + 1
12: else
13: f (docId)← 1
14: score← max j∈ f f ( j)
15: if score < τ` then
16: for i in range 1, . . . , ` do
17: v← himin(P)
18: if v /∈ gi then gi(v)← /0
19: gi(v)← gi(v) ∪ {ID(s)}
20: index← index ∪ {s}
21: return index
4.4 MinHash Generalization Properties
It is clear that the MinHash algorithm generalizes
naı¨ve methods that directly apply hash functions on
the entire string representation of the DOM, such
as (Duda et al., 2009) and (Frey, 2007). By gener-
alization we mean that for any given pair of states,
s1 and s2, and any given hash function h, if h(s1) =
h(s2), then applying our LSH scheme also yields an
equality between the states. Therefore, any pair of
pages that are considered the same state by a naı¨ve
hashing algorithm, will also be treated as such by the
method we propose.
More interesting is the fact that our algorithm is
also a generalization of a more complex method. The
algorithm in (Ayoub et al., 2013) identifies repeating
patterns that should be ignored when detecting dupli-
cate content. Denote by d1 and d2 two DOM strings
that differ in the number of times that a repeating pat-
tern occurs in them. More precisely, let d1 = ARRB
and d2 =ARRR..RRRB be two DOM strings, where A,
B, and R are substrings of DOM elements. Let us as-
sume that the method in (Ayoub et al., 2013) identifies
the repeating patterns and obtains the same canonical
form for both d1 and d2, which is ARB. This way,
d1 and d2 are identified as duplicates by (Ayoub et al.,
2013). It is easy to see then that if k< 2 |R|, where the
length of a DOM substring is defined as the number of
DOM elements in it, then the MinHash approach will
also mark these two DOM strings as duplicates, since
there is no k-mer that is included in d2 and not in d1,
and vice versa. This proof does not hold for the case
of d1 = ARB. However, our approach will also mark
d1 and d2 in this case as near-duplicate content with
high probability if k is relatively small comparing to
the lengths of A, B, and R.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we present the evaluation process of
the LSH based approach for detecting similar states.
We report the results of this method when applied to
real-world applications, and compare it to four other
state equivalence heuristics.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented a prototype of the LSH mechanism
for MinHash sketches as part of IBM R© Security App-
Scan R© tool (IBM Security AppScan, 2016). App-
Scan uses a different notion for crawling than most
other scanners. It is not a request-based crawler,
but rather an action-based one. The crawler utilizes
a browser to perform actions, instead of manipulat-
ing HTTP requests and directly executing code via a
JavaScript engine. While processing a new page, all
possible actions, e.g., clicking on a link, submitting
a form, inputting a text, are extracted and added to a
queue of unexplored actions. Every action is executed
after replaying the sequence of actions that resulted in
the state from which it was originated. The crawling
strategy is a mixture of BFS and DFS. As a result, the
crawler can go deeper into the application, while still
avoid focusing on only one part of it.
The MinHash algorithm can be combined with
any crawling mechanism. The algorithm marks re-
dundant pages, and their content is ignored. Offline
detection of duplicate content is not feasible for mod-
ern, complex applications with an enormous amount
of pages, since one cannot first construct the entire set
of possible pages. In fact, this set can be infinite, as
content might be dynamically generated.
We performed security scans on seven real-world
web applications and compared the efficiency of
our method with other DOM state equivalence algo-
rithms. The first three applications are simple RIAs,
which can be manually analyzed in order to obtain a
true set of all possible application states. We were
given access to two IBM-internal applications for
managing security scans on the cloud: Ops Lead and
User Site. As a third simple RIA we chose a pub-
lic web-based file manager called elFinder (elFinder,
2016). We chose applications that are used in prac-
tice, without any limitations on the web technologies
they are implemented with.
In order to assess the performance of a state equiv-
alence algorithm, it must also be tested on com-
plex applications with a significant number of near-
duplicate pages. Otherwise, inefficient mechanisms
to detect similar states might be considered success-
ful in crawling web applications. Therefore, we
also conducted scans on four complex online applica-
tions: Facebook, the famous social networking web-
site (Facebook, 2004); Fandango, a movie ticketing
application (Fandango, 2000); GitHub, a leading de-
velopment platform for version control and collabora-
tion (GitHub, 2008); and Netflix, a known service for
watching TV episodes and movies (Netflix, 1997), in
which we crawled only the media subdomain. These
applications were chosen due to their high complex-
ity and extensive usage of modern web technologies,
which pose a great challenge to web application secu-
rity scanners. In addition, they contain a considerable
amount of near-duplicate content, which is not always
the case when it comes to offline versions of real-
world web applications. We analyzed the results of
scanning the four complex applications without com-
paring them to a manually-constructed list of applica-
tion states.
Since a full process of crawling a complex RIA
can take several hours or even days, a time limit was
set for every scan. Such a limit also enables to test
how fast the crawler can find new content, which is
an important aspect of a black-box security scanner.
We report the number of non-redundant states
found in the scans, along with their duration times.
However, the number of discovered states does not
necessarily reflect the quality of the scan: a state
equivalence algorithm might consider two different
states as one (false merge), or treat two views of the
same state as two different states (false split). Fur-
thermore, the scan may not even reach all possible
application states. In order to give a measure of how
many false splits occur during a scan, we compute the
scan efficiency. The efficiency of a scan is defined
as the fraction of the scan results which contains new
content. In other words, this is the ratio between the
real number of unique states found and the number
of unique states reported during the scan. A too-strict
state equivalence relation implies more duplicate con-
tent and a lower scan efficiency. The coverage of
the scan is defined as the ratio between the number
of truly unique states found and the real number of
unique states that exist in the application. If the re-
lation is too lax, then too many false merges occur,
leading to a lower scan coverage. Inefficient scans
can have low coverage as well, if the scan time is con-
sumed almost entirely in exploring duplicate content.
As the scan coverage computation requires knowing
the entire set of application states, we computed it
only for the three simple applications. The scan ef-
ficiency is reported for all scanned applications.
This paper suggests a new approach for the state
similarity problem. Hence we chose evaluation cri-
teria that are directly related to how well the scan-
ner explored the tested applications. We do not as-
sess the quality of the explore through indirect metrics
such as the number of security issues found during
the scans. In addition, during the test phase AppScan
sends thousands of custom test requests that were cre-
ated during the explore stage. Such amount of re-
quests could overload the application server or even
affect its state, and we clearly could not do that for
applications like Facebook or GitHub. For these rea-
sons we do not report how many security vulnerabili-
ties were detected in each scan. Another metric that is
not applicable for online applications is the code cov-
erage, i.e., the number of lines of code executed by the
scanner. This metric cannot be computed as we only
have limited access to the code of these complex on-
line applications. However, it is clear that scans that
are more efficient and have a higher coverage rate can
detect more security vulnerabilities.
Our proposed method, MinHash, was compared
to four other approaches: two hash-based algorithms,
and two additional security scanners that apply non
hash-based techniques to detect similar states. The
Simple Hash strategy hashes every page according
to the list of DOM elements it contains (order pre-
served). The second hash-based method, the DOM
Uniqueness technique (Ayoub et al., 2013), identi-
fies similar states by reducing repeating patterns in
the DOM structure and then applying a simple hash
function on the reduced DOMs. As a third ap-
proach we used jA¨k (Pellegrino et al., 2015), which
solves the state similarity algorithm by computing
the Jaccard similarity between pages with the same
normalized URL. Another non hash-based approach
was evaluated by using CRAWLJAX (Mesbah and
Van Deursen, 2008). The crawler component of the
latter tool uses the Levenshtein edit distance to com-
pute similarity between pages. We used the default
configuration of these scanners. Section 2 provides
more details on the approaches we compared our tool
with.
We scanned the tested applications three times,
each time using a different DOM state equivalence
Table 1: Results of security scans on three simple real-world web applications using five different strategies for DOM state
equivalence: jA¨k (JK), CRAWLJAX (CJ), Simple Hash (SH), DOM Uniqueness (DU), and MinHash (MH). The first row
shows the real number of unique states in the application, whereas the second row contains the number of non-redundant
states reported in each scan. The next two lines provide the coverage and efficiency rates of the scans. In the last row, a
runtime of thirty minutes corresponds to reaching the time limit.
elFinder User Site Ops Lead
JK CJ SH DU MH JK CJ SH DU MH JK CJ SH DU MH
App states 7 18 27
Scan states 7 12 38 34 7 18 20 31 21 18 31 33 42 41 25
Coverage (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 94 100 100 93 89 89
Efficiency (%) 100 58 18 21 100 100 90 58 86 94 87 82 60 59 96
Time (m) 8 7 30 30 10 2 2 4 3 2 9 10 30 23 12
strategy. All scans were limited to a running time of
30 minutes. In the MinHash implementation we set
the value of k to 12, the number of hash functions, `,
to 200, and the minimum similarity threshold, τ, was
set to 0.85. The values of k and τ were determined
by performing a grid search and choosing the values
which gave optimal results on two of the tested appli-
cations. The number of hash functions, `, was com-
puted using Chernoff bound, so the expected error in
estimating the Jaccard similarity of two pages is at
most 7%.
5.2 Results for Simple RIAs
Table 1 lists the results of the experimental scans we
conducted on three simple RIAs. The results show
that using MinHash as the DOM state equivalence
scheme yields fast and efficient security scans, with
a negligible impact on the coverage, if any. Scan-
ning simple applications with jA¨k also produces high-
quality results. The rest of the approaches were less
efficient, overestimating the number of unique states.
Some of the scans involving the other hash-based
techniques were even terminated due to scan time
limit. However, since the tested applications were
very limited in their size, these approaches usually
had high coverage rates.
5.2.1 MinHash Results
The MinHash scans were very fast and produced con-
cise application models. They quickly revealed the
structure of the applications, leading to efficient scans
also in terms of memory requirements. The pro-
posed algorithm managed to overcome multiple types
of changes between pages that belong to the same
state. This way, pages with additional charts, ban-
ners, or any other random DOM element, were usu-
ally considered as duplicates (see Figure 2). Similar
pages that differ in the order of their components were
also correctly identified as duplicate content, since the
Figure 2: Successful merge of two views with the same
functionality using the MinHash algorithm. (a) Upper part:
a list view of a directory. (b) Lower part: the same view
with a textual popup.
LSH scheme is almost indifferent to a component re-
ordering. This property holds since a component re-
ordering introduces new k-mers only when new com-
binations of consecutive components are created. As
the number of reordered components is usually sig-
nificantly smaller than their size, the probability of
a change in the MinHash sketch is low. In addition,
multiple views of the same state that differ in a repeat-
ing pattern were also detected. This is in correspon-
dence with section 4.4, which shows that our method
is a generalization of the DOM Uniqueness approach.
There were, however, cases where different states
were considered the same, and this led to some con-
tent being missed. The missing states were very sim-
ilar to states that had already been reported in the
model. See section 6 for a discussion on this matter.
5.2.2 Results of Other Hash-Based Approaches
The scans produced by the other hash-based methods
had high coverage rate. However, they were some-
times very long, and the number of reported states was
very high (up to a factor of five compared to the cor-
Table 2: Results of security scans on four complex real-world web applications using five different strategies for DOM state
equivalence. The first column for every application contains the number of non-redundant states reported in each scan. The
second column provides the efficiency rate (%). Scans that did not reach the time limit and crashed due to memory or other
problems - are marked with asterisk.
Facebook Fandango GitHub Netflix
States Efficiency States Efficiency States Efficiency States Efficiency
jA¨k 1* 100 54 37 26 34 47 32
CRAWLJAX 68 38 32 50 184 30 40 40
Simple Hash 694* 2 493 4 306 22 206 7
DOM Uniq. 692* 3 468 5 266 30 133 17
MinHash 200 83 34 82 108 81 27 78
rect number of states). Some were even terminated
due to time limit. The stringency of the equivalence
relations led to inefficient results and to unclear ap-
plication models. Such models will also result in a
longer test phase, as the black-box scan is about to
send hundreds and thousands of redundant custom
test requests.
As expected, the naı¨ve approach of simple hashing
was very inefficient. The DOM Uniqueness method
had better results in two out of the three tested appli-
cations. However, relevant scans were still long and
inefficient (as low as 21% efficiency rate). Although
the algorithm in (Ayoub et al., 2013) detects similar
pages by reducing repeating patterns in the DOM, it
cannot detect similar pages that differ in other parts of
the DOM. Consider, for example, two similar pages
where only one of them contains a textual popup.
Such a pair of pages was mistakenly deemed as two
different states (see Figure 2). A similar case occurred
when the repeating pattern was not exact, e.g., a table
in which every row had a different DOM structure).
5.2.3 Results of Non Hash-Based Tools
The scans obtained using jA¨k and CRAWLJAX were
also very fast and with perfect coverage. However,
they were not always as efficient as the MinHash-
based scans. The relatively small number of pages
and states in the tested applications enabled short
running times, although these non hash-based meth-
ods perform a high number of comparisons between
states. Among the two methods, jA¨k was more effi-
cient than CRAWLJAX.
5.3 Results for Complex RIAs
The results shown in Table 2 emphasize that an accu-
rate and efficient state equivalence algorithm is cru-
cial for a successful scan of complex applications.
The MinHash algorithm enabled scanning these ap-
plications, while the naı¨ve approach and the DOM
uniqueness algorithm completely failed in doing so
in some cases. CRAWLJAX and jA¨k had reasonable
results; however, their efficiency rates were not high.
5.3.1 MinHash Results
The MinHash-based scans efficiently reported dozens
of application states, with approximately 80% of the
states being truly unique. In addition, the number
of false merges was very low. The algorithm suc-
cessfully identified different pages that belong to the
same application state. For example, pages that de-
scribe different past activities of Facebook users were
considered as duplicate content. This is, indeed, cor-
rect, as these pages contain the same set of possible
user interactions and the same set of possible secu-
rity vulnerabilities. A typical case in which the Min-
Hash algorithm outperforms other methods can also
be found in the projects view of GitHub, as can be
seen in Figure 3. A GitHub user has a list of starred
(tracked) projects. Two GitHub users may have com-
pletely different lists, but these two views are equiva-
lent, security-wise. Figure 4 depicts another example
of a successful merge of states.
At the same time, the algorithm detected state
changes even when most of the content had not been
changed. For instance, a state change occurs when the
Fandango application is provided with information on
the user’s location. Prior to this, the user is asked
about her location via a form. When this form is filled
and sent, the application state is changed, and geotar-
geted information is presented instead. This may af-
fect the security vulnerabilities in a page; hence the
need to consider these two states as different.
A successful split can also be found in the results
of the Facebook scan. The privacy settings state is al-
tered if an additional menu is open, and this change
was detected by our method (see Figure 5). Such
a case frequently occurs in complex online applica-
tions, where there are several actions that are common
to many views, e.g., opening menus or enabling a chat
Figure 3: Successful merge of two different states using the MinHash algorithm. Both sides of the figure show lists of starred
(tracked) GitHub repositories. (a) The left list contains information on the repository programming language for the first and
last items only. (b) The right list does not contain information on number of repository copies for the third item. Although
the items of the lists are not identical in their structure, the MinHash algorithm can detect that both lists belong to the same
application state. On the other hand, the DOM Uniqueness algorithm fails to merge these two states, since the lists do not
have the same constant repeating pattern. The DOM structure of every item in every list might be different than the structures
of its neighboring items, and thus the items cannot be reduced to a single repeating pattern.
Figure 4: Successful merge of two different states using
MinHash sketches. (a) Upper part: movie overview page
(b) Lower part: an overview page of a different movie.
sidebar. Therefore, the number of possible states can
be high. However, almost every combination differs
from the others, so they are usually considered differ-
ent states. We discuss a method to safely reduce the
number of reported states in section 6.
There were also cases where the MinHash algo-
rithm incorrectly split or merged states. One such
case was during the Facebook scan, when analyzing
two states that are accessed through the security set-
tings page. One state allows choosing trusted friends,
and the other enables a password change. Despite
their similarity, there are different actions that can
be done in each of these states. Hence, they should
be counted as two different states, and were mistak-
enly merged into one. In the opposite direction, some
states were split during the scan into multiple groups
because of insignificant changes between different re-
sponses. Section 6 suggests several explanations for
these incorrect results.
5.3.2 Results of Other Hash-Based Approaches
As was pointed in (Benjamin et al., 2010), when the
equivalence relation is too stringent, the scan might
suffer from a state explosion scenario, which requires
a significant amount of time and memory. This ob-
servation accurately describes the scans involving the
other two hashing methods, which often resulted in a
state explosion scenario. Even when they included
most of the states reported by the MinHash scans,
they also contained hundreds of redundant states.
This is due to the fact that the crawler exhaustively
enumerated variations of a very limited number of
states. The Facebook and Fandango scans reported
hundreds of states, with more than 95% of the states
being duplicate content. Moreover, since the Face-
book application is very complex and diverse, the
state explosion scenario caused these scans to termi-
nate due to memory problems.
It is interesting to analyze the performance of the
naı¨ve approach and the DOM Uniqueness algorithm
when crawling the list of starred (tracked) projects of
GitHub users. While it is clear that the naı¨ve approach
failed to merge two views with different number of
starred projects, it is surprising to see that the DOM
uniqueness algorithm also did not completely succeed
in doing so. The reason for that is because the items of
the list do not necessarily have the same DOM struc-
ture. Therefore, there is not always a common repeat-
ing pattern between different lists, and the lists were
not always reduced to the same DOM canonical form.
5.3.3 Results of Non Hash-Based Tools
The efficiency of the non hash-based scanners
dropped significantly comparing to their performance
on simple RIAs. This is due to the fact that complex
online applications pose challenges that are still not
well-addressed in these crawlers. CRAWLJAX re-
quires manual configuration of tailored comparators
to perform better on certain applications. Moreover,
CRAWLJAX is less scalable due to its all-pairs com-
parison approach.
The efficiency rates of the jA¨k scans were not
high, as the assumption that similar states must share
the same normalized URL is not always true. In the
Fandango application, for example, pages providing
movie overviews contain the movie name as a path
parameter, and thus are not identified as similar. The
same problem also occurred when jA¨k scanned Net-
flix. Multiple pages of this website offer the same
content and the same set of possible user interactions,
albeit they are written in different languages.
The crawling components of jA¨k and CRAWL-
JAX could not login to the Facebook application prop-
erly, so a fair comparison is not possible in that case.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present a locality-sensitive hashing
scheme for detecting duplicate content in the domain
of web application security scanning. The method is
based on MinHash sketches that are stored in a way
that allows an efficient and robust duplicate content
detection.
The method is theoretically proven to be less strin-
gent than existing DOM state equivalence strategies,
and can therefore outperform them. This was also em-
pirically verified in a series of experimental scans, in
which other methods, whether hash-based or not, ei-
ther completely failed to scan real-world applications,
or constructed large models that did not capture their
structure. As opposed to that, the MinHash scheme
enabled successful and efficient scans. Being able
Figure 5: Successful split of two nearly similar states us-
ing the MinHash algorithm. (a) Upper part: account setting
view of a Facebook user. (b) Lower part: the same view
with an additional menu open, adding a new functionality
to the previous state.
to better detect similar content prevents the MinHash
algorithm from exploring the same application state
over and over. This way, the scans constantly revealed
new content, instead of exploring more views of the
same state. The MinHash scans got beyond the first
layers of the application, and did not consume all the
scan time on the first few states encountered.
Reducing the scan time and the complexity of the
constructed application model does not always come
without a price. The cost of using an LSH approach
might be an increase in the number of different states
being merged into one, and this could lead to an in-
complete coverage of the application. However, the
risk of a more strict equivalence strategy is to spend
both time and memory resources on duplicate content,
and thus to achieve poor coverage.
This risk can be mitigated by better optimizing pa-
rameter values. The value of k, the shingle length, can
be optimized to the scanned application. One can take
factors such as the average length of a DOM state, or
the variance in the number of different elements per
page, when setting the value of k for a given scan.
Tuning the similarity threshold per application may
decrease the number of errors as well. Of course, the
probabilistic nature of the method also accounts for
some of the incorrect results, as the Jaccard similarity
estimations are not always accurate. Increasing the
number of hash functions can reduce this inaccuracy.
The LSH scheme can be applied to any web ap-
plication. However, there are applications in which
its impact is more substantial. Black-box security
scanners are likely to face difficulties when scanning
complex applications. Such applications often heav-
ily rely on technologies such as AJAX, offer dozens
of possible user interactions per page, and contain a
great amount of near-duplicate content. The Min-
Hash algorithm can dramatically improve the qual-
ity of these scans, as was the case with Facebook
or Fandango. For applications with less variance in
the structure of pages that belong to the same ap-
plication state, such as Netflix, the DOM uniqueness
state equivalence mechanism can still perform reason-
ably. But even in these cases, the MinHash algorithm
reaches the same coverage more efficiently.
A locality-sensitive hashing function helps in a
better detection of similarity between states. How-
ever, if a state is actually a container of a number of
components, each having its own sub-state, then the
number of states in the application can grow exponen-
tially. It seems reasonable that applying our algorithm
on every component separately would give better re-
sults. In this context, the component-based crawling
(Moosavi et al., 2014) could be a solution for decom-
posing a state into several building blocks, which will
all be analyzed using the MinHash algorithm.
The tested implementation of the MinHash
scheme is very basic. There is a need to take more
information into consideration when constructing the
DOM string representation of a response. For exam-
ple, one can mark part of the elements as more rel-
evant for security oriented scans, or use the value of
the attributes as well. Theoretically, two pages can
have a very similar DOM and differ only in the event
handlers that are associated with their elements. Al-
though this usually do not occur in complex appli-
cations, there were some rare cases where different
states were mistakenly merged into one state due to
that reason. Another potential improvement is to de-
tect which parts of the DOM response are more rele-
vant than others. By doing so we can mark changes in
elements that are part of a navigation bar as less sig-
nificant than those occurring in a more central part of
the application.
We believe that incorporating these optimizations
in the MinHash scheme would make this approach
even more robust and accurate. Combined with more
sophisticated crawling methods such as component-
based crawling, security scans can be further im-
proved and provide useful information for their users.
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